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Abstract  
Work on common pool resources has paid scant attention to the role of properties of natural 
resources  for the  way  their provision  is  governed. This paper scrutinizes determinants of 
institutions that regulate the provision of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Two cases of 
maintaining  ecosystem  services  are  compared  (protection  of  wolves  and  management  of 
scattered fruit tree meadows). Distinct characteristics of resources (mobility) and differences 
in  the  overarching  European  regulatory  framework  explain  their  different  institutional 
embeddedness.  Cost-effectiveness  considerations  seem  to  be  paramount  in  the  design  of 
institutions. In the case of wolf protection, the state uses its power to modify property rights in 
order to increase acceptance of wolf management. This is essential for political reasons as 
well as to prevent EU sanctions. On the other hand, scattered fruit tree maintenance is subject 
to voluntary, long-term agreements, justified by medium-term irreversibility and asset specific 
investments.  
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1. Introduction 
What determines the design  and performance of  institutions that regulate  the provision of 
ecosystem services? Addressing this question Ostrom (1986, quoted in Bromley 1991, p. 33) 
states that “(1) the nature of the resource itself; (2) the supply-demand conditions [...] (3) the 
characteristics  of  the  users  […];  and  (4)  the  characteristics  of  the  legal  and  political 
environment” need to be considered. This paper aims to undertake one step towards detailing 
the answer to this question. We compare the cases of safeguarding of wolf populations and 
maintaining  scattered  fruit  trees  in  Germany  and  argue  that  causes  of  the  way  they  are 
regulated are (a) in particular differences in mobility of the resource and (b) differences in the 
legal  and  political  environment  stemming  from  the  overarching  European  regulatory 
framework.  We  understand  regulations  implying  changes  of  institutions.  They  are  the 
outcome  of  politics  which  decide  on  the  “incidence  of  costs  and  benefits”  of  ecosystem 
services  (Bromley  1991,  p.  22).  In  the  context  of  social-ecological  interactions  we  view 
institutions as “[...] sets of interrelated rules governing given aspects of social life which are 
acknowledged (or sanctioned) by all or some members of society. They regulate relationships 
among individuals and between the social and ecological systems, i.e. rights and duties as 
well as costs and benefits of actions … [and therefore] …. link social and ecological systems” 
(Gatzweiler  and  Hagedorn  2002,  p.  3;  see  also  Berkes  and  Folke  1998).  Institutional 
economics  considers transaction costs,  i.e. the costs of actors  informing  themselves about 
options,  negotiating,  agreeing,  monitoring, enforcing, and adapting  institutions (Dahlmann 
1979).  Transaction  costs  matter  as  information  is  costly  and  actors  are  assumed  to  be 
boundedly rational and act opportunistically when they are given the opportunity for rent-
seeking. Under these circumstances institutions provide certainty concerning the behaviour of 
transacting  partners.  Transaction  costs  result  from  the  consequent  need  to  establish  and 
maintain institutions which constrain and structure human interaction (e.g. North 1990).  
Our  argument  and  findings  support  the  discrete  alignment  hypothesis  (Wiliamson  1985, 
1998), where  “transactions are aligned with governance structures” (Williamson 2000, p. 
595, Bougherara et al. 2005). In order to allow for comparison, we select two instances of 
biodiversity  and  ecosystem  services  conservation  within  a  rather  similar  regulatory  and 
political context, namely that of two German Länder. We consider biodiversity a common 
pool resource (CPR) as it is rival in consumption because of conflicts with other land uses, but 
from which it is difficult to exclude.  
We develop the argument that physical characteristics of transactions affect the way problems 
of  provision  and  consumption  of  CPE  are  resolved.  First,  we  introduce  our  analytical 
perspective on the way ecosystem services are socially regulated. Second, we present our two   3 
empirical  cases.  Third,  we  apply  our  analytical  lens  to  the  empirical  cases  and  make 
comparisons. Finally, we summarize our argument and provide a brief outlook.  
2. An eco-institutional perspective on social regulation 
The paper is framed around the concept of ecosystem services delivery and considers social-
ecological transactions in nature-related sectors as the basic unit of analysis. Such “[p]hysical 
transactions not only include direct transfers from one or many others, but the transfers may 
be indirect… intended or unintended, targeted or non-targeted, predictable or unpredictable. 
[….] Such properties of transactions are likely to play a greater role if they are related to 
natural systems than in the case of man-made systems” (Hagedorn 2008: 362). In this paper, 
transactions  and  their  characteristics  are  the  explanans  concerning  the  way  they  are 
institutionally structured. For analytical purposes we single out individual transactions that 
contribute  to  the  principal  services  that  policies  aim  at.  Transactions  have  specific 
characteristics determined by the temporally and spatially specific properties of the social and 
ecological systems they are embedded in. These socially constructed characteristics describe 
the interdependence between actors as mediated by non-human nature (Paavola and Adger 
2005,  Young  2002).  As  such,  interrelated  characteristics  of  transactions  are  shaped  by 
resource  characteristics.  Specifically,  we  use  a  list  of  distinct  resource  characteristics 
(Resource  Unit (RU) and Resource System  (RS))  that research  has thus  far  identified as 
significant  in  shaping  Social-Ecological  Systems‟  (SES)  performance  Ostrom  (2007)  and 
Ostrom  et  al.  (2007).  Figure  1  relates  the  mentioned  characteristics  of  resources  to 
characteristics of transactions. 



















First, we ask how property rights, as subgroup of institutions (Hagedorn 2008), are shaped by 
characteristics of resources. Through the definition of property rights coercive units – often 
the state – play an important role in resolving – often local – environmental conflicts. Second, 
we ask how governance structures deal with varying characteristics of resources. Governance 
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structures – as description of the coercive units (Bromley 1992) – monitor and sanction (or 
not) property rights. The explanandum of this paper are the institutional settings including 
property rights, property regimes, and governance structures (or authority systems (Bromley 
1992)) in which the respective social-ecological transactions take place. Property rights are 
defined as “a claim to a benefit stream that some higher body – usually the state – will agree 
to protect through the assignment of duty to others who may covet, or somehow interfere with, 
the benefit stream. Rights have no meaning without correlated duties […]. Property is not an 
object  but  is  rather  a  social  relation  that  defines  the  property  holder  with  respect  to 
something of value (the benefit stream) against all others” (Bromley 1992, p.2).  Bromley 
(1991) highlights four essential symmetrical legal correlates defining property rights in which 
the state or any other higher authority either takes an active enforcing role (static: a right for 
A is duty for B; dynamic: power for A to change rights of B are B‟s liability) or a passive role 
(static: where A has privilege of no interference and B therefore has no right to interfere; 
dynamic: where A has immunity of interference by B which therefore has no power).  
Governance structures sanction property rights (Williamson 1985). They refer to the way the 
“unit of coercion” (Bromley 1991, p. 3), i.e. a higher authority or the state, enforcing property 
rights  is  organised.  Governance  structures  entail  several  aspects:  property  regimes, 
entitlements, and other structures such  as knowledge systems,  management plans, dispute 
settlement  arrangements,  and  monitoring  infrastructures  (Hagedorn  2002).  Vatn  (2005,  p. 
254) defines property regimes as “structure of rights and duties characterising relationships 
between  individuals  with  respect  to  specific  good  or  benefit  streams”.  They  differ  from 
property  rights  and  may  entail  state,  private  (both  of  relevance  below),  common,  or  no 
property (open access) (Bromley 1992). They differ in rights and duties for property holders, 
and  in  the  incentives  concerning  maintenance  and  improvement  of  the  resource  and 
transaction costs which origin from monitoring and enforcement (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).  
As another way for detailing the analysis of governance structures Bromley (1991) proposes 
to look at different entitlement structures. They differ in the way they back up property rights 
to specific components of nature and in situation-specific transaction costs (Hagedorn et al., 
2002). Property rights that are protected by a property rule are protected against unwanted 
(and proscribed) incursions of either physical or economic nature. Thus, the property right has 
to be acquired by the interfering actor before interference can legitimately take place. To have 
a right that is protected by a liability rule is to rest assured that “the party committing that act 
is [ex-post] liable for damages…”(Bromley 1991, p.  49). Finally, if a right is protected by an 
inalienability  rule  interference  with  it  is  inadmissible  under  all  circumstances  and  no 
compensation is required (Bromley 1991, p.46).  
The  subsequent  description  and  analysis  of  the  two  case  studies  is  empirically  based  on 
scientific literature as well as regional planning materials and other documentations. 
 
3. Presentation of the case studies 
3.1 Case study: wolf management in Upper Lusatia  
Wolves have been listed among the priority species to be protected under the European Flora-
Fauna-Habitats (FFH) Directive. Nevertheless, wolves are adaptable to the strongly human-
dominated  European  landscapes.  Their  habitats  range  over  large  territories  –  often  over 
hundreds of kilometres; they are top-predators that naturally occur at relatively low densities. 
Therefore, management of wolves cannot be organised within confined protected areas, as 
their respective habitats usually cross administrative and political borders (Gehring and Potter 
2005).  
The natural migration of wild wolves in Upper Lusatia has substantial effects on biodiversity 
and ecosystem services in the regional landscape and beyond. Most of the benefits derived 
from  the  maintenance  of  wolf  populations,  such  as  enriched  biodiversity  and  touristic 
attractiveness are experienced at  higher scales of society. Potential conflicts and costs  fall   5 
disproportionally on rural communities  within  the range of  the  wolves.  Thus,  wolves are 
affecting human well-being directly and indirectly in many ways. In this study, we focus on 
the  conflicts  and  transactions  caused  by  the  depredation  of  domestic  animals.  Livestock 
depredation  is  among  the  principal  causes  of  conflict  and  at  the  core  of  problems  of 
acceptance of wolf conservation and has resulted in elaborated forms of social regulation.  
 
Characteristics of transactions 
Wolf attacks on domestic animals reduce the number of the respective flock of sheep or goat. 
Clearly, there is a strong rivalry in consumption. Since wolves kill only as much prey as they 
need to feed their pack the number of domestic animals killed per incident can be considered 
as rather moderate. Naturally, this transaction can be considered as irreversible (SMUL 2009). 
While the effects of the attacks are local, the likelihood of this „transaction‟ (attack) to occur 
at a particular time and place as well as the overall frequency of attacks is extremely difficult 
to predict. This is due to the fact that a wolf pack covers a very large area of about 250 km
2 
(Kluth and Reinhardt 2009). Further, wolf habitats may also shift over time. Thus, unlike the 
herded animals, wolves are very mobile. Similar to the quantitative impact (damage) of such 
an attack, also the temporal and spatial occurrence depends, among others, on the availability 
of wild games, the size of the respective wolf pack, the protective measures, and the number 
of herds of domestic animals in the region. In this sense, the transaction can also be regarded 
as complex and as interdependent with other natural resources and human activities. 
Income losses due to wolf attacks can be avoided by investments in protective measures, such 
as electric fencing of the herding area. That is, wolves can be excluded from the consumption 
of the domestic animal resources. Protective measures have moderate asset specificity as for 
example fencing material can be disassembled. Yet, time and labour to build the fence at a 
particular location or to train a herd protection dog, can be considered as sunk costs (SMUL 
2009). 
 
Social regulation structuring the transactions 
While migration of wolves into Upper Lusatia is a natural phenomenon, the persistence of the 
settlement and the increase in the number of wolf packs, i.e. the maintenance of this particular 
feature of biodiversity in the region, is predominantly facilitated by state activities. Based on 
several international legal provisions, the German national state and the Land Saxony have 
implemented  formal  rules  to  protect  wolves  and  to  undertake  measures  to  enable  their 
populations to grow. Most  important  is the strict prohibition to kill wolves, or translocate 
them. In contrast recovery of populations is the predominant policy objective. Sanctions for 
defection are quite severe. Since 2002,  wolves  in the Saxony part of  Upper  Lusatia  have 
depredated over 200 domestic animals in 50 incidents. In almost all incidents the respective 
herds were not (sufficiently) protected against wolves (SMUL 2009). However, as Gehring 
and Potter (2005) remark: “Failure to effectively reduce or prevent carnivore-human conflict 
(e.g., wolf-human conflict) can lead to an erosion of social tolerance for carnivores [...]”. 
Thus,  in order to reduce the economic  motivation of  holders of domestic animals  to kill 
wolves illegally on the hand and to increase social acceptance of wolves‟ protection on the 
other,  ex-post  compensation  schemes  for  damages  and  protective  measures  have  been 
introduced by the authorities and private organisations.  
In Saxony, subject to two conditions, the Nature Protection Law of Saxony provides for the 
financial compensation of commercial and non-commercial holders of domestic animals for 
the income losses incurred by the attacks of wolves. Conditions hold that holders of domestic 
animals  have to  implement protective  measures (e.g.,  herd protection dogs and/or suitable 
fences). Otherwise, holders of domestic animals would only have limited incentives to invest 
in protective measure. These compulsory measures only apply to the so-called wolf area (i.e. 
the area presumably and knowingly covered by wolf packs) plus an additional buffer zone of   6 
30  km.  Outside  this  territory,  all  damage  to  domestic  animals  by  wolves  qualifies  for 
compensation. The borders of the wolf areas are dynamic. Once a wolf pack settles in an area 
outside  the  current  „official‟  wolf  area,  the  „official‟  wolf  area  is  extended  accordingly. 
Commercial holders of domestic animals in the wolf area can apply for financial assistance in 
the amount of 60% of the costs incurred. As a second condition, holders of domestic animals 
have to report animals killed to the district authorities within 24 hours in order to receive the 
compensation. 
In  addition  in  order  to  improve  the  habitat  conditions  for  the  wolf  and  to  increase  the 
acceptance of wolves in the general public, a wolf management system was established. It 
focuses  on  scientific  research  (including  monitoring),  advice  for  state  agencies  and 
stakeholders, public relations and practical measures to increase the acceptance of wolves. 
Other  private  organisations  complement  the  wolf  management  Further,  there  are  many 
honorary „wolf protectors‟ (Wolfsschützer) gathering information on wolf packs in the region 
(SMUL 2009). 
3.2 Case study: maintenance of scattered fruit tree meadows in the Swabian 
Alb 
Scattered  fruit trees  (Streuobst) represent a  land  use  system composed of open  stands of 
standard  fruit  trees  within  gardens,  meadows,  or  crop  fields.  In  many  German  regions 
scattered fruit tree meadows were introduced in a systematic form as a land use innovation in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, mainly with the aims of improving the profitability of agriculture 
and provisioning the population with food. First established on gardens and crop fields, these 
lands were later converted to meadows. Important uses of land below the fruit trees were the 
growing  of  fodder  grasses,  cereals,  root  crops,  vegetables,  and  berries.  The  share  of  the 
agricultural area planted with scattered fruit trees is particularly high in hilly areas, where the 
topography limits the potential of more intensive forms of land use. Recently, scattered fruit 
tree meadows have come increasingly under threat. In the case presented here we address the 
core transaction of changes  in private  land use practices that cater  for the  maintenance of 
scattered fruit trees.  
In the Land  Baden-Württemberg, scattered  fruit  tree  meadows cover around 7.1% of the 
agricultural  surface  (an  estimated  116,000  ha).  Since  the  1950s  their  area  has  heavily 
declined. Despite drastic decline, the forelands of the Schwäbische Alb Mountain Ranges (a 
UNESCO Biosphere Reserve) still harbour the largest contiguous landscape of this type in 
Europe.  
The area covered by scattered fruit trees is declining because of several trends that shaped 
European landscapes in past decades (Vos and Klijn 2000). First, many scattered fruit tree 
orchards were systematically replaced by more intensive forms of agriculture and horticulture. 
Second, scattered  fruit tree plantations often concentrate at the edge of  villages and cities 
which  made  them  vulnerable  to  land  conversion  for  urbanisation  and  infrastructure 
development. Third, many scattered fruit tree plantations have been partly or fully abandoned 
due to lack of profitability. Therefore, many remaining scattered fruit trees are overaged, lack 
regeneration, and are overly neglected. Most of the remaining scattered fruit tree plantations 
have shifted from professional pomiculture to part-time farmers and hobby land users (Weller 
2006). 
The  decline  of  scattered  fruit  tree  plantations  has  provoked  deep  societal  concern  as 
biodiversity and ecosystem  services they provide  have become  highly appreciated  (Weller 
2006; Herzog 2000). The importance to produce fruit has declined, but scattered fruit tree 
meadows continue to deliver provisioning services such as regionally produced fruits and act 
as a reservoir of manifold genetic varieties. As a visual component of cultural landscapes, 
they fulfil important services of recreation, scenic values, and regional identity. They provide   7 
critical  regulating  ecosystem  services,  e.g.,  by  improving  the  local  climate,  buffering 
groundwater pollution or controlling surface-runoff and soil erosion.  
 
Characteristics of transactions 
Management and preservation of scattered  fruit tree  meadows  is connected  with  multiple 
transactions. Most goods and services provided by scattered fruit tree meadows are produced 
jointly. For example, an intensive use of fertilisers or pesticides to allow for higher grassland 
yields is likely to reduce the suitability of the meadows as habitats for some species.  
In  the  following,  we  focus  on  the  „production‟  of  the  resource  unit  „scattered  fruit  tree 
meadow as a visual feature of the regional cultural landscape‟ that may be enjoyed by both 
local residents and tourists. Support of biodiversity and ecosystem services is inherent. Given 
alternative ways of „using‟ the land, the transaction we focus on is at the heart of policies to 
maintain  scattered  fruit  tree  meadows.  Usually  it  is  not  possible  to  exclude  people  from 
benefiting from the aesthetic value of the meadows. Further, enjoyment of the landscape and 
biodiversity  are  non-rival  in  consumption  making  the  service  provided  by  our  focus 
transaction a public good. In contrast, the production of a concrete scattered fruit tree meadow 
covers a particular piece of land. Thus, there is rivalry with respect to alternative land uses, 
and the resource unit is both site specific and immobile. If not restricted by land use zoning 
requirements,  land  owners  may  choose  to  convert  the  land  into  a  different  use  or  apply 
different  production  methods.  Management  of  scattered  fruit  trees  comprises  intensive 
orcharding  practices,  such  as  grafting  and  several  pruning  technique,  and  there  is  some 
moderate  knowledge  and  usually  also  capital  (machinery)  specificity.  These  management 
practices have to be carried out regularly, yet only with a moderate frequency. Further, we 
consider the natural cause-effect-relationships are rather regular, continuous, and well-known 
in ecosystems of scattered fruit tree meadows. In addition to rivalry in production and non-
excludability, and required asset specific investments we therefore consider the maintenance 
of scattered fruit tree meadows as a non-heterogeneous, non-variable transaction of regular 
but moderate frequency. Its effects are reversible, yet reconversion from a different land use is 
only possible in the medium term.  
 
Social regulation structuring the transactions 
In the Swabian Alb, scattered fruit tree plantations are predominantly in private, small-scale 
ownership. Non-governmental organisations such as Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU) 
were among the first who called for the conservation of scattered fruit tree meadows. In more 
recent years, subsidised schemes for the protection of Streuobst have been developed. Several 
incentive-based approaches promote conservation through sustainable use of fruit products. In 
many  areas,  apple  juice  from  scattered  fruit  trees  is  commercialized  with  an  additional 
premium to compensate for management of scattered fruit tree meadows.  
One of the most prominent schemes to support scattered fruit tree ecosystems in the Swabian 
Alb is the PLENUM-project. It aims to preserve and develop nature and environment and, 
while initiated at Länder level in 1993, it practically started in the Swabian Alb in 2001. Yet, 
in years with particularly high yields many fruits are not used at all (left on the ground) due to 
unfavourable cost-benefit-relations. Within the PLENUM-project, scattered fruit trees  have 
been  preserved  by  developing  particular  apple  juice  brands  and  liquor  brands.  For  these 
products only fruits are used that come from plots where among other things the trees are 
managed in an environmentally friendly way and where grassland beneath the trees is used 
extensively.  Producers  get  an  additional  premium  for  adhering  to  mentioned  production 
practices.    8 
4. Comparing and explaining differences in institutional structure  
In  this  section  we  use  our  „analytical  toolkit‟  introduced  in  section  two  to  compare 
characteristics of transactions and the way  in which they are  institutionally  structured and 
make an attempt at explaining the differences observed.  
The  services  that  the  two  transactions  that  we  focus  upon  imply  show  some  similar 
characteristics.  Non-rival  and  non-excludable  ecosystem  services  are  provided  at  several 
spatial scales and for various actors. These services are „produced‟, among others, by owners 
of land (by adhering to specific production methods) and holders of domestic animals (by 
providing prey and/ or investing in prevention measures). These services are jointly produced 
with  other  services  and  share  features  of  complex  interdependence  with  other  natural 
resources. Both transactions involve asset specific investments in knowledge, materials, and 
sites.  
Yet, apart from these commonalities there are substantial differences in the characteristics of 
the two transactions resulting from the resource characteristic of either mobility or immobility 
(or stationarity). We argue that – to a large extent – they account for the differences in how 
the  transactions  are  socially  regulated  by  institutions  and  governance  structures.  First, 
individual depredations of either wolves or domestic animals  are  irreversible. In  contrast, 
maintenance of scattered fruit tree meadows is not. Different types of resources are provided 
in each case. Adhering to prescribed management practices subtracts welfare from owners of 
meadows  and  animals,  making  both  provisions  rival.  In  the  case  of  depredation  of 
(unprotected) domestic animals by wolves, exclusion from this disservice is possible, while in 
the case of implementing specific fruit tree growing practices (providing habitat) exclusion is 
not possible. Thus, to start with, providing prey for wolves or protection from wolves through 
fencing is a private good, while scattered fruit tree meadows at the scale of landscapes are a 
local common pool resource. Together with the contingent position of wolf protection and 
maintenance of scattered fruit trees in overarching European legislations, as we argue below, 
this results in different conditions on entitlements securing property rights. Finally, decisive in 
explaining  differences  in  regulation  are  also  other  differences  in  characteristics  of  the 
resources.  The  mobility of wolves results  in the specific characteristics of this transaction 
being variable, heterogeneous, and uncertain. Stationarity of scattered fruit tree meadows, in 
turn, results in relative low variability, heterogeneity, and uncertainty of potential costs and 
benefits streams emerging from this transaction.  
In the following we turn to the regulations that emerged from this setting and explain the 
corresponding differences. More precisely, we need to explain why depredation of domestic 
animals by wolves is governed by hierarchical administrative mechanisms and „on the spot 
compensations‟  and  why  changes  in  land  use  practices  in  scattered  fruit  tree  areas  are 
governed by (medium-term) hybrid governance structures, such as voluntary agreements.  
Further, we need  to explain  the spatial differentiation of  rights and duties associated with 
property rights to domesticated animals and land and the respective entitlements backing up 
property rights  (property  rule  for property rights  in  land  vs.  liability rule  for property  in 
domestic  animals).  Explanation  is  provided  by  cost-effectiveness  and  distributional 
considerations  in  regard  to  transaction  costs  associated  with  respective  institutions. 
Institutions are the administrative ways to implement public policies which have previously 
been socially elaborated and agreed subject  to  the  rules of politics,  which are  not  under 
scrutiny  here.  We  start  our  comparison  and  explanation  of  differences  focussing  on 
institutions structuring the depredation of domestic animals, followed by the case of scattered 
fruit tree meadows. 
     9 
Table 1: Comparison of properties of transactions and their regulation  




Wolf protection is codified „European societal‟ legislations. Thus, the national and „regional‟ 
state on behalf of the EU and its citizens holds privilege with regards to wolf populations 
which  implies no power  as a  correlate  for all other actors. This  right  is protected by an 
entitlement structure of inalienability. Practically, implementing this right conflicts with local 
access rights. It interferes with privilege that private owners of domestic animals hold over 
their animals independent from the property rights to the land on which these animals graze. . 
Importantly though, this may not preclude the state‟s privilege concerning wolves, as the state 
in  this  regard  is  bound  by  higher  level  regulations.  In  this  situation  lower  levels  of 
government use their „dynamic‟ powers and modify property rights in order to mitigate the 
local  consequences  of  higher  level  legal  provisions.  They  turn  „privilege‟  given  to  state 
                                                 
1 Based on the classification by de Groot (2002). 
2 The table illustrates that characteristics of resource units and systems are not equivalent to relational 
characteristics of transactions and that indeed the difference should be maintained. Similar complex 
interrelations between the two types of categories could be described for other characteristics of resources. 
Definitions of characteristics of resources and transactions can be drawn from the literature indicated. They vary 
in relation to the specific author consulted. 
  Wolves  Difference  Scattered fruit tree meadows 
Description of 
transaction 
Provision of ecosystem services 
Use change; accept losses for providing of 
biodiversity and landscape 
Accept deterioration of property rights to 
animals, as acceptance of depredation of 
domestic animals  
  Provision of ecosystem services 
Use change, accept losses for providing 
for biodiversity and landscape 
Accept limitations on property rights to 
land 
Functions involved
1  Habitat, recreational, cultural     Habitat, recreational, cultural, 
production 
Scale of service 
provision 
Local to global public goods    Local to global public goods 
Explanans - Properties of transactions 
Rivalry  Strong rivalry (living or dead animal)    Strong rivalry (to piece of land) 
Excludability  Yes   x  No  
Frequency  Moderate/ irregular  x  Moderate/ regular 
Asset specificity  Yes – concerning exclusion technology/ 
certain sunk costs 
  Yes - material and knowledge/ certain 
sunk costs 
Heterogeneity  High  x  No, as relative regularity across space 
applys to all 
Jointness  Not so pronounced     Highly pronounced 
Variability  High  x  Low, but transactionwith great 
regularity 
Reversibility  No, up to a threshold - substitutable at 
landscape scale 
x  Yes, in medium term 
Complex  Yes    Yes 
Changes in cost/ scale  Yes, local    Yes, local for land owners 
Changes in benefits/ scale  Individual, local to global    Individual, local to global 
Who produces   Local animal owners    Local land owners 
De jure property rights   Privilege of state property to wolves, no 
right for owners of domesticated animals 
x  Land owner has rights/ state has to 
respect 
Explanandum – Institutional organisation of transactions 
De jure property regime 
at stake 
Wolves are state property 
Domestic animal holders have right to have 
animals grazing/ state needs to respect this 
x  Private property, protected by a 
property rule 
Difference de facto and 
de jure property rights 
No     No 
Governance structure  Hierarchical  x  Hybrid - voluntary long term 
agreements 
Entitlement structure  Protected by a liability rule, conditioned by 
obligation to prevent within 30 km distance 
of wolf area and obligation to report within 
24 hours 
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property in wolves – and its correlate of no rights for owners of domestic animals – into a 
situation where animal  holders are  given rights which reconstitute benefit streams derived 
from  holding  their animals  in cases of  infringement of animal owner privilege over their 
animals by state protected wolves. These rights are secured by a liability rule, i.e. an ex-post 
entitlement to compensation of losses incurred. These modifications are handed down in a 
hierarchical  way.  Thus,  owners  of  domestic  animals  cannot  opt  out  (power  /  liability 
correlates).  Two  rationales  seem  to  underlie  this  modification  of  property  rights:  1)  as 
codified  in the constitution the state  needs  to sustain economic  wellbeing of  its citizens, 
despite the fact that it is not the state that kills domestic animals but the wolve, in whose 
existence it only holds privilege. 2) In order to avoid both, backlashes in local and regional 
elections and self-help actions (e.g., illegal killing of wolves) by those (actually or potentially) 
suffering from the presence of wolves, the federal government and the German Länder aim to 
increase acceptance of protective wolf management. Mentioned „self-help‟ could backfire on 
Germany and the Land Saxony and result in EU sanctions.  
We  argue  that  cost-effectiveness  considerations  have  been  driving  the  selection  of 
entitlements to secure the described problem of lack of human agency (responsibility) behind 
the actions of wolves. Cost-effectiveness is determined by characteristics of transactions. The 
overarching aim was to promote acceptance of wolf conservation. Damage done to domestic 
animals  is assessed at  lowest cost and  in a  fair  manner after  the depredation took place. 
However given the interrelated properties of transactions of depredation of domestic animals 
(variability,  heterogeneity,  uncertainty)  ex-ante  agreements  on  buying-off  those  animals 
which  may  be  killed  by  wolves  in  the  future  cannot  be  established.  First,  such  ex-ante 
purchases of rights to kill cannot be allocated in a fair fashion if compensations were equally 
distributed among all owners of domestic animals in a specified area. Second, more targeted 
lump sums are not feasible given the unpredictability of the transaction with respect to time, 
place, extent, and concerned human transaction partner (owner of the killed animal). Such 
compensation under a property rule entitlement would presumably be ineffective in increasing 
acceptance of wolf conservation. For organising the ex-ante purchase of property rights in a 
fair and  targeted  manner, compensating actual damages would be  very costly  considering 
paramount uncertainties of wolves‟ behaviour and uncertain distribution of damages (number 
of animals depredated and frequency of attacks). To further minimize transaction and overall 
costs of the regulation, the state complemented the entitlements for „damaged‟ animal owners 
when compensated for costs incurred with above described conditions. Animal owners are 
burdened with the transaction costs of reporting depredations by wolves. The state is able to 
distribute costs of monitoring in that way because it modifies property rights in a way that 
favours animal owners as responsible wolfs can neither be killed nor would animal holders be 
compensated.  
The second condition (fencing) addresses the trade-off between investments into non-lethal 
preventive measures and ex-post compensation for incurred damages. Within a distance of 30 
km  from  the  wolf  area,  the  state  imposes  these  (transaction)  costs  for  implementing 
preventive  measures on the owners of domestic animals as a condition  for compensation. 
Again,the state is able to make this distributional decision as in the context of the overall 
modification  of  property  rights  it  substantially  improves  the  welfare  position  of  animal 
owners (which otherwise would have had no right). In addition, the state also mitigates the 
financial implications of this second condition by co-financing such preventive investments. 
Concerning overall acceptance prevention is presumably more effective than compensation 
once damages occurred. However, where further away than 30 km from the wolves‟ area the 
likelihood of killings and compensations are too low to justify protective measures. Here, the 
state accepts negative publicity from such killings and the need to pay compensations.   11 
Maintenance  of  scattered  fruit  trees  is  not  prescribed  by  European,  national,  or  regional 
legislations. Thus, the state does not enjoy privilege in this regard, and in fact, owners have 
the  right  to  use  their  land  within  what  is  defined  as  legitimate  uses  (e.g.,  zoning). 
Furthermore, beyond its opportunity costs (benefits forgone from alternative uses of the land) 
maintenance of scattered  fruit trees requires specific  investments  in preservation activities. 
Such specific investments do not exist in the same way for the services provided by wolves. 
With  adherence  to  support  schemes  to  maintain  scattered  fruit  trees,  what  (Schlager  and 
Ostrom  1992)  call  ‟management  right„,  (i.e.  the  right  in  cost  and  benefit  streams  from 
determining and harvesting from the land) is voluntarily sold to private consumers of apple 
juice, the German Federal State or the EU. For these reasons, governance of maintenance of 
scattered fruit trees is structured by bilateral voluntary agreements between the land owners 
and those interested in services derived from scattered fruit tree meadows. As opposed to the 
case of wolves (presumably for political reasons) neither actor has the ability to impose legal 
relations for the transacting partners (correlates of no power/ immunity, Bromley 1991)). Still, 
such maintenance requires asset specific investments and is only reversible in the medium 
term.  For  this  reason,  a  hybrid  governance  structure  is  selected  in  form  of  a  long-term 
contract,  which establishes  for example  how  fruit  is to be  grown  in order to qualify  for 
marketing under a specific quality label. It is to avoid opportunistic behaviour by those paying 
for  and  those  protecting  scattered  fruit  tree  maintenance,  and  insures  that  asset  specific 
investments made by land owners pay off over time. Property rights to land use (management 
and  harvest)  are  secured  by  a  property  rule  as  entitlement  structure,  which  requires  this 
property  to  be  purchased  before  costs  are  incurred  by  land  owners  due  to  changes  in 
management practices. Such a property rule – in contrast to the liability rule applied in the 
case of wolves‟ protection  –  makes sense on  two accounts: 1)  given relative certainty of 
opportunity  costs  of  scattered  fruit  tree  maintenance  because  of  high  predictability  of 
occurrence of the transaction (characteristics of  low  uncertainty, variability,  heterogeneity) 
and associated cost and benefit streams significantly lowers transaction costs of determining 
and relating compensation levels to benefits foregone and damages incurred; 2) opportunity 
costs of scattered fruit tree maintenance carried by individual land owners cannot be excluded 
from.  Thus,  as  they  necessarily  incur  these  costs  no  condition  is  required  that  would 
incentivise applying an optimal  level of care or of prevention of damages. Nevertheless, 
compliance with specified farming practices require monitoring. Finally, due to lack of data 
we cannot conclusively compare the distributional incidence of monitoring costs. We expect 
that in distributing monitoring costs of changes in land use practices the state has a much 
worse negotiation position Owners of scattered fruit trees voluntarily adhere and only do so if 
their overall benefit  (e.g., premiums paid) outstripped overall costs,  including  monitoring 
costs.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we showed how institutions – as expressions of public policy concerning the 
environment – are shaped by characteristics of resources and the legal position that specific 
characteristics of components of  nature enjoy  in overarching rules  for example at the  EU 
level.  We  found  that  the  state  applies  a  cost-effectiveness  calculus  concerning  its  policy 
objectives,  which,  in  both  cases  includes  the  acceptance  of  changes  in  environmental 
management,  implying costs either  for owners of domestic animals or  scattered  fruit  tree 
meadows. Among others, in both cases biodiversity as (global) public good as well as specific 
ecosystem services are provided, benefiting mainly actors at the regional level. A multitude of 
transactions  is  connected  with  the  respective  environmental  management  measures.  We 
focused on two transactions that directly link to the provision of the services which were the 
dominant policy objectives. Differences in the institutional designs organising the transactions 
emerge, on  the one  hand,  from  the differences  in property rights as outcome of different   12 
political  priorities  ascribed  to  wolf  protection  and  conservation  of  scattered  fruit  tree 
meadows, and, on the other hand, from differences in properties of transactions. The state 
enjoys  privilege  concerning  interference  with  wolves  derived  from  European  legislations, 
giving domestic animal owners no rights. Owners of scattered  fruit trees,  in  turn, enjoy a 
property right in land within the scope of overarching legislation which has to be respected by 
the national and the regional state and the rest of society. These different legal positions in 
conjunction with differences in heterogeneity, variability, and uncertainty of transactions – all 
of which can be related to the extreme mobility of wolf packs and immobility of scattered 
fruit  tree  management  practices  –  explain  the  way  policies  enhancing  the  acceptance  of 
biodiversity provision are institutionally regulated. The state uses its power in the case of wolf 
protection to impose certain transaction costs upon owners of domestic animals. At the same 
time,  it  uses this power to  modify property rights  in order to  increase acceptance of wolf 
management. Reactions to wolf  conservation  in the case study as well as all over  Europe 
show that this  is essential  for political reasons (e.g., to avoid  loss of  votes) as well as to 
prevent  EU  sanctions.  On  the  other  hand,  scattered  fruit  tree  maintenance  is  subject  to 
voluntary, long-term agreements, justified by medium term irreversibility and asset specific 
investments.  The  specific  entitlement  regimes  can  be  explained  with  transaction  cost 
considerations and trade-offs between stochastic prevention and compensation costs  in the 
case  of  domestic  animal  depredations.  The  state  responds  to  the  unpredictability  of 
depredations by wolves with a liability rule in order to reduce transaction costs. Given the 
predictability of cost and benefit streams in the case of maintenance of scattered fruit trees it 
applies a property rule.  
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